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ABSTRACT. The paper discusses a piece by one of the most outstanding 
Danish short story writers of the 19th century, structured around the 
convential elements of detective stories. Relying on Jean Baudrillard’s 
simulacra theory, it attempts to demonstrate the process of how the 
intriguer Morten Bruus, by a successful use of make-believe, manages 
to incriminate a pastor, Søren Qvist, in a murder although he is 
innocent. Bruus’s manipulative strategy prevails in the end: he 
succeeds at deceiving both his environment and the judge presiding in 
the case, and the accused is executed. The truth is revealed only twenty 
years later when Niels Bruus, long thought to be dead, returns. 
Drawing on Derrida’s legal philosophy, the analysis seeks to expose 
the problematic nature of justice on earth, and it shows by revisiting 
certain ideas of Kierkegaard that even in the shadow of death, steadfast 
faith in divine justice can get us over our fears and the eternal 
uncertainty deriving from the essence of human existence. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is a little-known fact that the Scandinavian crime 
mysteries so popular today have a history dating back to the nineteenth 
century. We find the genre suffusing not just the epic poetry of the period, but 
the Scandinavian drama of the times as well. Discussing Hedda Gabler in her 
recent Ibsen monograph, Helge Rønning, for instance, points to the obvious 
similarities between detective fiction and that drama. (Rønning 2006:220–226) 
Præsten i Vejlby (The Rector of Veilby, 1829), an early work by Steen Steen-
sen Blicher, who is generally considered to be the greatest of the nineteenth-
century Danish short story writers, is an integral part of this tradition: its very 
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subtitle (En criminalhistorie – a Danish criminal fiction)1 calls attention to its 
genre. Indeed, the story line reads like a murder mystery. Structurally, 
however, the novella is composed of two distinct parts: the first is the diary of 
Erik Sørensen, the newly appointed district court judge, while the second 
consists of some events noted down years later by the rector of Aalsø. The 
story that emerges from these two documents can be summarized as follows:  
District court judge Erik Sørensen finds himself having to pronounce a 
death sentence on the rector, Søren Qvist, the man whose daughter he was 
about to marry. The person responsible for this predicament, the evil genius 
who set both men up, is Morten Bruus, who had earlier on applied in vain to 
Qvist for his daughter’s hand in marriage. Proud and used to getting his way, 
the wealthy Bruus decides to avenge himself on Qvist for his humiliation. He 
talks his younger brother into going to work for Søren Qvist. An ill-natured 
fellow, Niels Bruus regularly comes into conflict with the quick-tempered 
rector, who slaps him on the face on one of these occasions. From there on, 
everything plays into the hands of Morten Bruus. He makes no secret of 
egging his brother on to further insolent provocations of Qvist. Events take a 
fateful turn when, following a heated exchange of words between the rector 
and his hired hand, the rector strikes Niels Bruus with a shovel. Niels falls to 
the ground but soon recovers, jumps over the back fence of Qvist’s property, 
and runs off  to tell his brother. Recognizing his big chance, Morten Bruus 
makes the reluctant Niels help him dig up the body of a recently deceased 
servant buried in their farmyard at Ingvorstrup. They dress the body – identical 
to Niels in size and stature – in Niels’s clothes. Then, in the dead of night, 
Morten Bruus steals Qvist’s green dressing gown, puts it on, and buries the 
exhumed body in Søren Qvist’s garden. The very next day, he goes to 
Sørensen, the district court judge, and accuses the Rector Qvist of the murder 
of his brother. Erik Sørensen’s gut reaction is that the rector is incapable of 
such a crime, and refuses to believe the incriminating testimony of the 
witnesses that Morten Bruus brings before him. But when Morten Bruus 
„finds” the body dressed in Niels Bruus’s clothes in the rector’s garden, and 
„recognizes” his dead brother, the judge has no choice but to bow to what 
appears to be compelling evidence. As for the rector himself, initially he 
denies the charges. But then he recalls some violent acts he had committed 
while sleep-walking in years gone by, and becomes convinced that he had, in 
fact, done the deeds: gone after the wounded Niels in the night, finished him 
off, and buried him in his garden. In a final desperate effort to save the father 
of the woman he loves, Judge Sørensen makes arrangements – by bribing the 
  
1 Steen Steensen Blicher, Præsten i Vejlby. En criminalhistorie. Tekst efter (med ind-
lendning og noter) serien ”Danske Klassikere.” (DSL og Bergen) Det Kongelige Bibliothek http: 
//www2.kb./elib/lit/dan/blicher noveller.dkl/06.htm  - Steen Steensen Blicher, The Rector of 
Veilbye. A crime fiction. www. Public-library. Uk/ebooks/81/75.pdf. 
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jailer – for Qvist to escape, but the rector refuses to avail himself of the 
opportunity. Erik Sørensen knows no alternative but to condemn him to death. 
Qvist is beheaded, and the truth of the matter emerges only twenty-one years 
later, when the „murdered” Niels Bruus shows up at the Aalsø rectory. The 
story he tells finally sheds light on every detail of  the now deceased Morten 
Bruus’s heinous plot. When Erik Sørensen hears the truth, he has a nervous 
breakdown. Tortured by remorse, he dies some weeks later. Within a few days, 
Niels Bruus himself is found dead, sprawled across the Rector Qvist’s grave.  
Historians of Danish literature have given particular consideration to this 
novella for some time now, with Søren Baggesen (Baggesen 1965)  being the 
first to publish a detailed analysis of Blicher’s work. But it is not only literary 
historians who have focused on the story of the Rector Qvist, legal and 
religious scholars have done so as well. Henrik Poulsen and Peter Garde, for 
instance, approached the work specifically from a lawyer’s point of view. 
(Poulsen 1970, Garde 2007) Interest in Præsten i Vejlby has continued to this 
day. The theologian Jasper Langballe devoted an entire chapter to the novella 
in his Blicher monograph. (Langballe 2004) Karen Margarethe Simonsen 
discussed the work in terms of the problematic practice of judicial murder 
(Simonsen 2006) while Henrik Skov Nielsen examined Blicher’s story for 
points of intersection between it, on the one hand, and Kirkegaard’s stages of 
life theory and Derrida’s philosophy of law, on the other. (Nielsen 2009) Most 
recently, Maria Jørgensen has given a psychoanalytical interpretation of 
Præsten I Vejlby drawing extensively on Jacques Lacan’s ideas on error and 
knowledge. (Jørgensen 2012) I myself shall now attempt an analysis, keeping 
in mind all the interptretations alluded to above, and Henrik Skov Nielsen’s 
research in particular. 
2. CHARACTER SKETCHES 
In part one of the novella, we see the story unfolding through the eyes of 
the first-person narrator, the district court judge. From this exclusive point of 
view, Judge Erik Sørensen might, at first glance, appear to be the exact 
antithesis of Morten Bruus; in fact, however – and in keeping with the Law of 
Symmetry – the two characters emerge as being mirror images of one another. 
(Jørgensen 2012:64–69)  They have in common the fact that, as rivals for the 
hand of Mette Qvist, both aspire to having Søren Qvist for their future father-
in-law, and share an avowed faith in the putative justness of the law.  
Judge Erik Sørensen is preparing to fill his new office convinced that his 
mandate is directly from God: as he says, “Hver Mands Dom kommer af Herren.”2 
  
2 "From the Lord alone come the judgement." Proverbs 29:26. This, and all Biblical quotes 
to follow, are from the King James Version of Bible. Cambridge, 1611, 1769. 
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No surprise, then, that Sørensen composes his diary entries in biblical terms. 
He considers himself to be the repository of Mosaic law, a man whose every 
intellectual move must substantiate the existence and exclusive validity of the 
symbolic order personified by the Lacanian “big Other”, or, in the final analy-
sis, God. (Zizek 2006) The entries that best reflect his personality are studded 
with paraphrases from the Old Testament, and the parts expressing his hopes 
for his private life form one seamless fabric with his musings on his professio-
nal future. Rational argumentation is the organizing principle we find in both 
cases: intuition has no place in this philosophy of life. “Thy wife shall be as a 
fruitful vine…” (Psalm 128:3), he writes, in optimistic expectation of a happy 
family life with Mette, but then this hope is overshadowed by the memory of 
another Old Testament passage: “Favor is deceitful, and beauty is vain…” 
(Proverbs 31:30). Sørensen’s first-hand experience of the lovely Mette’s sweet  
temper and modesty makes no difference; his paraphrase of the proverb –  
“Skønhed er bedragelig, og Dejlighed er en forgængelig Ting”3 – is  a 
categorical denial of his own personal experience of her. The “testimony” of 
the anonymous psalmist carries more weight than his own impressions. So 
pervasive is this mindset of Sørensen’s that even his stratagem for getting to 
know Mette better is analogous to the process of gathering evidence for 
presentation in a court of law: he gives more credence to the objective 
observations of an impartial outsider than to the subjective impressions of his 
own enamored senses: “Min Avlskarl har tjent der I tre Aar, jeg skal dog saa 
listelig udforske ham, hvorledes hun er imod Folkene, samt hvad han ellers 
monne vide om hende. Af Tyendet faar man ofte den sikreste Underretning.”4 
In the same way as he will rely on witnesses in the case against Søren Qvist 
rather than on his gut feelings, so he dare not rely solely on his intuitions even 
in choosing a wife. Law-obsessed as Eric Sørensen is, ostensibly he is a man 
who to whom bribes are an abomination.  When Morten Bruus offers him too 
good a deal, for instance, he categorically turns him down.5  His motto is: “vi 
har jo Lov og Ret I Lande.”6 These very same words,7 however, would be 
cynically echoed by the villain, Morten Bruus, in his allegations against the 
Rector Qvist; and when, in a last-ditch, frantic effort to save the rector, Judge 
  
3 „Beauty is deceptive and charm is a dangerous thing.” 
4 „My head farm hand served in the rectory three years. I will question him, - one often 
hears a straight and true statement from servants.” 
5 Early on in the story, we learn that Morten Bruus wanted to present the judge with a calf. 
Not much later, Judge Sørensen wonders in his diary why Bruus wants to sell him a pair of 
horses at a ridiculously low price, and can only conclude that the transaction was meant to be a 
bribe. 
6 “We have law and order in the land”. 
7 „Vi har jo Lov og Ret i Landet, og en Morder kan ikke undgaa sin Straf, om han saa 
havde Stiftamtmanden til Svigerson.” – „We have law and order int he land, and the murderer 
shall not escape his punishement, even if he have the district judge for a son-in-law.” 
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Sørensen makes plans for bribing the jailer into letting Qvist escape, we cannot 
help feeling that, morally speaking, there is not much left to differentiate the 
judge from Morten Bruus. A key scene from the point of view of our 
understanding the relationship between the two men is the one in which Judge 
Sørensen reads out the verdict in the property dispute between Ole Andersen 
and Morten Bruus. Well we might ask why the latter, a man infamous for his  
overweening ways and aggressive nature, accepts the judgment against him 
with such complacency. One reason, obviously, is that the disputed property is 
of little value, and its ownership is of little consequence to a man of Morten 
Bruus’s means. More importantly, however, it gives Bruus an excellent 
opportunity to demonstrate that no matter what, he is a decent, law-abiding 
man. People, as we know, tend to automatically conflate the notion of being 
law-abiding with the notion of rectitude: a man who obeys the law even when 
the verdict is against him cannot be a “bad” man, a man prone to crime. Bruus’s 
deliberate and theatrical acquiescence in Sørensen’s judgment makes 
something of a farce of the proceedings, but his calculated behavior is an 
integral part of his long-term strategy. His cynical grin (which Sørensen sees) 
on hearing the judge read the words is more than the malevolent smirk of a 
schemer sure of his ultimate victory; it is an adumbration of the gist of the 
story, namely, that the instruments of the law are not equal to the job of getting 
at the truth. 
3. THE POWER OF SIMULACRA 
The much-cited postmodern philosopher, Jean Baudrillard, chose the 
following quotation as the motto of the first chapter of his Simulacres et 
simulation: “Le simulacre ne jamais ce  qui cache la verité – c’est la verité qui 
cache qu’il n’y en a pas. Le simulacre est vrai.” Baudrillard 1981:1–30) 
Baudrillard claims that Ecclesiastes is his source for this quote, which, of 
course, is bogus, since there is no such statement in the Old Testament. The 
bogus citation is itself an ironic hint at the problematic nature of accessing 
(divine) truth. As Baudrillard sees it, the reality of the tangible world around 
us comes into question at every turn. What we take to be the “real world” does 
not, in fact, exist. All we really have is signs, whose referents are beyond our 
grasp. Everything is only the mapping, the simulation of some entity which we 
believe to be real. It is these simulacra which model our world, presenting us 
with a network of signs which we cannot decode. With our consciousness 
incapable of distinguishing a simulation of reality from reality, we are left with 
the all-encompassing uncertainty of a virtual world of appearances. 
The motto from Baudrillard’s extraordinary work quoted above can be 
taken to speak to the nub of Morten Bruus’s lethal machinations. The weapon 
he uses against the judge and the rector is one against which both men are 
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defenseless: verisimilitude. He manipulates appearances with a coherence and 
sophistication that overrides any suspicion of unreality. What makes Bruus’s 
scheme so diabolical is that things could have happened exactly as he says 
they did. Søren Qvist did have a heated exchange of words with Niels Bruus 
and did hit him with a shovel, and Niels did fall to the ground. But then, a few 
minutes later, he came to,  jumped Qvist’s back fence, and ran off. All that 
Morten Bruus needs to do to make his vengeful version of events credible is to 
leave out some details of what actually happened. So he leaves out the “small” 
details of having stolen and himself donned the rector’s green cloak, and of 
having dressed a dead stranger’s body in his brother Niels’s clothes. These 
“adjustments” apart, everything happened as he claims, and the sworn 
eyewitnesses confirm:   Qvist’s green cloak was seen digging and burying a 
body in his garden. Simulacra never hide the truth, writes Baudrillard, since 
every perceptible and causally related aspect of the object world serves to 
make empirically perceivable the phenomenon we call “reality”: it serves, in 
short, to ostensibly corroborate the “visible”, the “tangible” “truth”. In our 
case, the truth is that the body (the very image of Niels Bruus) really is dug up 
in Søren Qvist’s garden; it wears Niels’s clothes, and bears the imprint of a 
blow with a shovel on its head. Moreover, several people saw a figure clad in a 
green cloak digging in the rector’s garden in the dead of night. Who else could 
it have been, if not the Søren Qvist? So tenacious is the formative ability of 
simulacra that it can effect its reverse in our consciousness: it is the truth itself 
that hides the fact that there is no truth. What better testament to the uncanny 
power of simulacra than the accused rector’s despair, and his reluctant 
admission: “Skinnet er imod mig”.8 Blicher’s story is built around an entire 
chain of simulacra: the anonymous dead servant is Niels Bruus’s look alike; 
clad in the rector’s cloak, Morten Bruus looks like Qvist to those who see him 
digging in Qvist’s garden; and finally, the vengeful Bruus comes across as 
Judge S0rensen’s alter ego throughout the judicial proceedings, and wears his 
intellectual mask.  
4. FAITH IN TRUTH 
Jacques Derrida, in his Force de loi, treats as axiomatic the idea that the 
legal systems regulating social relations have been based on the correlatives of 
justice and force from the beginning of time. (Derrida 1994) It was some 
originary act of violence that first established the fiction of justice. From that 
very moment of the institution of the system of laws, there has been no real 
way to challenge the original source of legal authority. From this it directly 
follows that the courts which pass judgment never really serve justice, but 
  
8 “Appearances are against me”. 
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simply enforce the law. Following Montaigne, Derrida argues that laws are 
legitimate not because they are just, but simply because they are the law. The 
immanent regulating principle of all legislation at any given time, therefore, is 
the unlimited power of the prevailing machinery of government. The legal 
system so generated has nothing to do with the principles of justice, let alone 
of Christian charity: its sole basis is brute force.9  
Seen in this light, even the commandments imprinted on Moses’s stone 
tablets are nothing more than vengeance invested with the force of law. From 
the very beginning, Blicher’s novella makes clear that Erik Sørensen’s 
judgments are brought in the same spirit. Mosaic law, for instance, allows 
anyone to legally take the life of a person guilty – according to the testimony 
of at least two witnesses – of having committed a mortal sin.10 The same 
practice is followed in Judge Sørensen’s court. When Mette Qvist asks him 
what law obliges him to judge her father so harshly, he makes no apologies for 
his answer: “siden I spørger mig ad: den mildenste Dom, som baade Gud og 
Kongen har afsagt, er dog Liv for Liv.”11 This is the merciless dictum of the 
Mosaic law: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Well might even the most 
religious wonder whether every man’s judgment does indeed come from the 
Lord. To complicate matters further, Erik Sørensen himself turns his back on 
the law when, a few minutes after his harsh pronouncement, he advises Mette 
to bribe the jailer into letting her father escape. Morten Bruus, as we have 
seen, exploits the law to satisfy his personal desire for vengeance; when it 
comes to exploiting the law to satisfy one’s personal desires, however, Erik 
Sørensen is no better, for his advice to Mette to circumvent  the law is 
motivated by his emotional involvement in the case and personal need to 
oblige her. 
In another philosophical essay, Donner la mort, Derrida offers an analysis 
of Kierkegaard’s Frygt og Bæven. (Derrida 1994) On this reading, 
Kierkegaard sees acting “out of duty” in the universalizable sense of the law as 
a dereliction of one’s absolute duty. Dereliction of one’s absolute duty, 
however – as Derrida argues in Force de loi  –  is tantamount to abandoning 
the pursuit of justice. In Blicher’s novella, Eric Sørensen definitely takes this 
easy way out when, despite his intuitions to the contrary, he goes with the 
“evidence” and simply orders the rector’s execution. Derrida makes a strong 
point of noting that we cannot speak of justice being served until the judicial 
  
9 For more on how Derrida might be seen to shed light on Blicher’s novella, see Henrik 
Skov Nielsen, op. cit.  
10 1 Kings 21:9-10: „And she wrote in the letters, saying, Proclaim a fast, and set Naboth 
on high among the people: And set two men, sons of Belial, before him, to bear witness against 
him, saying, Thou didst blaspheme God and the king. And then carry him out, and stone him, 
that he may die.”   
11 “But I dare not conceal from you that the mildest sentence that God, our king, and our 
laws demand is, a life for a life.” 
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system manages to resolve the contradictions between the correlatives of 
justice and the law. Detailing these contradictions, he calls attention to three 
aporia in particular. First aporia: the general principles enshrined in the law 
cannot be applied mechanically to singular cases. As long as we insist on 
following the letter of the law, we are likely to bring mistaken verdicts. The 
second aporia, closely related to the first, is the problem of undecidability. In 
searching for the truth , we will never discover the secret crux of the matter by 
rigidly following the rules. Every judicial decision will necessarily leave us 
with an unsettling sense of the case’s undecidability. The third aporia is the 
challenge posed by the decision’s urgency: the urgency, as Derrida puts it, that 
obstructs the horizon of knowledge. A judicial decision, obviously, should be 
just, and swiftly brought; but in most cases, it is simply impossible to meet 
both requirements. The fact is that one can never be sure that some new and 
decisive evidence might not emerge at some later date, evidence that would 
completely change the direction of the hearings. A judge, however, must finish 
hearing the evidence within a certain time frame, and must pass judgment on 
the basis of the testimony presented to that time. This being so, it is, for the 
most part, purely a matter of chance if his judgment happens to coincide with 
justice.  
Judge Erik Sørensen, for one, cannot find his way out of the conundrum 
encapsulated in Derrida’s aporia. He is incapable of considering the rector’s 
case in all its singularity, and though in his heart of hearts he is not at all 
convinced of Qvist’s guilt, he feigns decisiveness to mask his troubling 
foreboding of the case’s undecidability. The driving force behind the evidence 
that is presented is Morten Bruus, and not the judge, who has clearly lost his 
hold on the proceedings. Judge Sørensen soon becomes a weightless figure, 
whose weak gestures are overshadowed by the cynical machinations of Morten 
Bruus. When the judge speaks, it is the institutionalized voice of a thoroughly 
impersonal Law that we hear, law that is no longer grounded in reality. In 
addition, he fails the test of Derrida’s third aporia: he has no time to wait out 
the return of Niels Bruus, i.e., the piece of evidence that would have given 
Qvist’s case a decisive turn. What is more, he ends up a victim to the 
implacable logic of his own Mosaic interpretation of the law: a life for a life – 
his own life for the life of the innocent Rector Qvist.   
5. THE TRUTH OF FAITH 
This parallel notwithstanding, a key element of the story is the rector’s 
emergence as a foil for the judge’s thinking and character. The execution of 
the innocent Qvist stands in lethal contrast to Sørensen’s maxim that “every 
man’s judgment cometh from the Lord”. Indeed, the judge does everything in 
his power to legitimate the divine order of which he considers himself to be 
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the deputy here on earth, while Qvist, for his part, sacrifices his life to validate 
his faith in the integrity of the visible world. Throughout the story, Judge Erik 
Sørensen tries to act “out of duty” in Kierkegaard’s sense of the term, 
mechanically differentiating guilt from innocence, and good from evil. As 
Derrida points out, however, acting simply out of duty is really a dereliction of 
one’s absolute duty. With no objective criteria to guide us, it is a dilemma that 
has no real solution on a purely ethical plane. The only way out is to recognize 
that in relation to God, we are always in the wrong.12 This is precisely what 
Søren Qvist does when, abandoning his own ethical scruples, he simply admits 
his guilt, and, as befits a man of the cloth, puts his fate in God’s hands: “’Jeg 
er en stor Synder!’ tog han til Orde, ‘hvor stor – det ved Gud, jeg ved det ikke 
selv. Han vil strafe mig her, at jeg hisset kan faa Naade og Salighed, ham være 
derfor Pris og Ære!’”13 
The motive force behind the rector’s confession of his guilt is the 
simulacrum effect. When  he finds his green cloak not in its usual place but 
lying on the floor, memories of past episodes of somnambulism flash across 
his mind, and he recalls learning that he had done things that he himself did 
not remember doing. Positing another such somnambulist episode seems to 
Qvist to account for what presumably happened to Niels Bruus. Reconstruc-
ting the events in his head, the rector recalls that Niels got up after he knocked 
him down with his shovel, and managed to escape through the back fence. 
Continuing the story as if in a dream, Qvist sees Niels fall over dead in the 
neighboring woods. He then sees himself going to get the body, bringing it 
home, and burying it in his garden. When the rector tells his story to Eric 
Sørensen, the judge finds it a coherent account of the events; just one small 
detail is still unclear, namely, the rector’s state of consciousness at the time of 
his last three “acts”. What the judge does not even consider is the possibility 
that the facts of the matter are obscured by the appearances, in other words, 
that it was not Qvist who wore the green cloak that fateful night. The appearan-
ces, at any rate, confirm the rector’s guilt even at the unconscious level: the 
pictures conjured up by his neurological disorder ostensibly present the 
transpired events in the same logical order as they are presented to the judge in 
real life in the course of the criminal proceedings. The fictive account 
construed and presented by Morten Bruus,  and the fantasy generated by Søren 
Qvist’s overwrought brain are both perfect examples of the suggestive power 
of simulacra: both prove capable of overriding reality. Particularly if the refe-
  
12 In his The Gift of Death, Derrida ponders the meaning of Abraham’s sacrifice in terms 
of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. The quote, however, refers to another work of 
Kierkegaard’s, the sermon that ends Part II of Either/Or (Kierkegaard 1996), entitled: “Det 
opbyggelige, der ligger i den Tanke, at mod Gud have vi altid Uret.” 
13 „’I am a great sinner’, he sighed, ’God only knows how great. His punishement crushes 
me here that I may enter into His mercy hereafter.” 
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rents of the deconstructed traces of objective reality continually suggest the 
primacy of simulacra, and prepare the way for their triumph. 
When giving his testimony, the Rector Qvist speaks at length of some 
memories of his childhood and early youth. He recalls that once, when his dog 
stole and ate his buttered bread, he got so angry that he kicked the dog, which 
then expired. The incident was a warning for him to control his temper, but he 
did not really learn from it. While at school in Leipzig, he challenged a fellow 
student to a duel and injured him so gravely that the young man almost died of 
his wound. In retrospect, these actions seem to Qvist to adumbrate the 
fulfillment of the Biblical admonition: “But I say unto you that whosoever is 
angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment…” 
(Matthew 5:22). Having succumbed to the temptations of his violent temper all 
his life, the rector sees his punishment as just and inevitable. Still, the New 
Testament as a whole suggests a break with the Old Testament notions of sin 
and punishment. The mercy of Christ, the hope of forgiveness offers a real 
way out of an equivocal ethical world based on the dichotomies of true and 
false, good and evil. The only solution, as Søren Qvist sees it, is to trust in 
God, accept the stigma of being a common murderer in the eyes of the world, 
and embrace the gift of death. The rector ends his testimony before the judge 
with the following words: “jeg længes efter Døden, thi jeg haaber for Jesu 
Skyld, den skal vorde mig en Indgang til et bedre Liv end dette nærværende, 
der nu ikke har andet at yde mig end Kval og Forfærdelse.”14 Seen in this 
light, it is irrelevant whether the chain of evidence really proves that the rector 
– who truly was responsible for several violent acts in the past – did, in fact, 
commit the murder he stands accused of, or whether the ever-manipulable 
judicial process simply allowed some incriminating “facts” into the diaboli-
cally deceptive world of appearances. This is why Derrida maintains that 
justice is always a future thing; no one, speaking in the present, can claim that 
he is dispensing justice.   
In the last third of the novella, the comments jotted down by the rector of 
Aalsø form a deliberate counterpoint to Erik Sørensen’s conviction that a 
judge’s right to pass judgment comes from God. “Hvad er dog et Menneske, at 
det tør opkaste sig til Bloddomer over sin Lige?”15 - he exclaims, then goes on 
to make clear that only God has that right. His statement is open to at least two 
interpretations. Theologically speaking, it obviously calls attention to the 
necessary shortcomings of any worldly justice - “kun Gud hører Hævnen til”16 
– declares the rector of Aalsø, thereby undermining the basis of Eric Sørensen’s 
philosophy of law. Under no circumstances can a man, a mortal judge, be the 
  
14 “I long for death. Go now, my kind, sympathetic judge. Send for me to-morrow to speak 
my sentence, and send to-day for my brother in God, the pastor in Aalsø.” 
15 “Oh, what is man that he shall dare to sit in judgement over his fellows!” 
16 “God alone is the Judge”. 
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instrument of divine retribution. God does not expect something for something;17 
what He offers every man is the unconditional mercy of salvation. As St. Paul 
reminds us, “…A man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith 
of Jesus Christ…” (Galatians 2:16). No wonder that it makes little difference 
to Søren Qvist whether he is guilty or innocent according to the law of man. 
He confesses himself to be guilty primarily on very different grounds: “…The 
scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ 
might be given to them that believe” (Galatians 3:22). As an heir to Abraham, 
he can win eternal life only by first losing his life on earth.18 That is why he 
refuses to avail himself of the opportunity for flight offered by Judge Sørensen. 
Considered from a more general point of view, Præsten i Vejlby is an overt 
critique of the death penalty. Two years prior to writing his novella, Blicher 
wrote an article on the subject (Om Dødstraffe), excoriating this cruel judicial 
practice with arguments based mostly on Montesquieu and Cesare Beccaria. 
(Blicher 1983:264–268) In this essay, Blicher calls capital punishment a case of 
sheer revenge, and argues for its replacement by efforts on the part of the 
authorities to reeducate the criminal. Given the questionable legitimacy of 
capital punishment and the dangers of its being no more than judicial murder – a 
chance that must be unacceptable to every humanist thinker – Blicher’s 
suggestion, like his novella, deserves serious consideration to this day. 
The true contemporary appeal of the story, however, lies primarily in 
Blicher’s thoroughly modern appreciation of the ambivalence informing our 
world in the 21st century. In the guise of a simple detective story, the core issue 
of the narrative adumbrates that extraordinarily ambiguous postmodern 
“feeling” which is incapable of clearly distinguishing truth from falsehood, 
and a copy from the original. At the same time, we see the tiumph of faith over 
reason: see the faith of the dead rector emerge as a vital force that transcends 
the absurd, and the living death of the judge’s cold, stiff rationality. Præsten i 
Vejlby, thus, is relevant in our times for its broad conceptual interface with the 
questions – and possible answers – addressed by today’s theologians and 
philosophers of law. 
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